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by DAVID SHERWYN, PAUL WAGNER, and GREGG GILMAN
The state of the law governing sexual harassment,
which was far from clear, was rendered more turbid by
a 1998 U.S. Supreme Court holding that offered exam-
ples of specific situations under which such harass-
ment might be actionable. The Court’s ruling in a case
of same-sex harassment has muddied the waters by
opening the issue of the alleged harasser’s motiva-
tion. This provides a defense for harassers who may
rebut the accusation that their actions are motivated
by sexual interests. In addition to making same-sex
harassment difficult to prove, this holding makes it
nearly impossible for an individual to make a case of
sexual harassment when that harassment is not spe-
cifically directed at that person even though the con-
duct at issue is severe or pervasive. Employers seek-
ing to promote fair play and to prevent claims of sexual
harassment must maintain strict no-harassment poli-
cies and educate their staffs on the reasons for such
policies.
Keywords: sexual harassment; Oncale Homan;
Rene; no-harassment policies
Training to avoid sexual harassment is a commonfeature of many employers’ employee-relationsprograms. In many cases, the trainers focus on
the dos and don’ts of harassment but fail to educate the
employees as to the state of the law. This is a problem
because, in a vacuum, training is often frustrating.
Managers and employees are put in embarrassing situ-
ations while the company explains what seem to be
draconian polices that in an effort to make the work-
place harassment free, create a culture of fear and dis-
trust. Because law is unsettled and confusing, it is
nearly impossible, without education, to create polices
that managers and employees can understand and
accept—as we explain in this article.
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An example of the confusion surround-
ing the law concerns the answer to the fol-
lowing question: is it unlawful under fed-
eral law to sexually harass employees
because of their sexual orientation? Under
a plain reading of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, its legislative his-
tory, and Supreme Court and lower court
precedent, the answer is, clearly, no. At
least one jurisdiction, however, has cho-
sen to ignore existing law and forge a new
path. In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, LLC,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that plaintiffs enjoy a cause
of action for sexual harassment where
the harassment is based solely on the
alleged victim’s sexual orientation.1 The
confusion of Rene forms the basis of this
article.
During the Center for Hospitality
Research’s Labor and Employment Law
Roundtable, the panelists discussed
(among other topics) whether Rene could
be either reconciled with the language of
Title VII and existing precedent or
explained as unabashed judicial activism.2
The panelists’ discussion provides the
basis for this article, which after providing
an overview of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tracks the evolution of
sexual harassment law since 1998 and
identifies the problems and inconsisten-
cies within its evolution. At the end, we
propose a management strategy for liabil-
ity prevention in the face of the ever-
changing and unpredictable law of sexual
harassment.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Does Not Address Sexual
Harassment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, national origin, religion, and sex. It
does not address what we have come to
term as sexual harassment, which has
come to the fore in a series of judicial
holdings. In its 1986 Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson decision, the Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether
employers violated Title VII when a
supervisor harassed an employee, but the
employee did not suffer any tangible eco-
nomic consequences.3 The Court held that
sexual harassment did, in fact, violate
Title VII, regardless of whether there was
an economic loss, because the harassment,
if severe enough, changed the conditions
of employment. The Meritor Court
explained that there were two types of sex-
ual harassment: (1) quid pro quo and (2)
hostile environment. Quid quo pro harass-
ment is easily defined as requiring “sexual
relations” in exchange for such things as
continued employment or promotions.
Hostile-environment sexual harassment is
much more difficult to explain. For this
purpose, the Meritor Court essentially
adopted the definition of a hostile environ-
ment found in the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
Guidelines. The Court described the
EEOC Guidelines as follows: “In defining
‘sexual harassment,’ the Guidelines first
describe the kinds of workplace conduct
that may be actionable under Title VII.
These include ‘[unwelcome] sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature.’”4 The Court did not, however,
discuss motivation of the alleged harasser
or the reasons supervisors might harass
employees. In fact, the Court did not even
provide a precise definition of sexual
harassment. Instead, it simply provided
examples of unlawful sexual harassment.
Lower Courts Created a Split in
the Definition of Sexual
Harassment
Because the Meritor Court did not
define sexual harassment, the precise
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meaning of that term was left open to
interpretation by lower courts, which have
disagreed on that definition. Shortly after
Meritor, the Sixth, the Eleventh, and the
Federal Circuits held that a plaintiff had to
prove actual psychological damage to
make out a case of hostile environment.5
Other jurisdictions, including the Ninth
Circuit, expressly rejected this standard.6
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Supreme Court resolved the split in the
circuits’ definitions by holding that a
plaintiff need not prove psychological
damage to prove sexual harassment.7
Instead, the Court held that a plaintiff need
prove only that the conduct, from both an
objective point of view (the so-called rea-
sonable person) and a subjective perspec-
tive (that of the plaintiff himself or herself)
was “so severe or pervasive that it created
a work environment abusive to employees
because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin.”8 Based on the plain lan-
guage of Title VII and on Supreme Court
precedent, both requiring disparate treat-
ment on the basis of sex, the Court’s hold-
ing could be understood as creating a two-
part test to prove sexual harassment: (1)
the conduct must be severe or pervasive
and (2) the motivation for the harassment
must be the plaintiff’s sex. In reality, how-
ever, the conduct—not the motivation—
was the only factor that the majority opin-
ion, the concurring opinions, and the
academic, legal, and lay commentaries
focused on.
Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence,
for example, did not mention motivation
and instead lamented the fact that the
“severe or pervasive” standard “does not
seem to me a very clear standard.”9 Justice
Scalia, however, admitted he could not
clarify the ambiguity: “Be that as it may, I
know of no alternative to the course the
Court today has taken.”10 Justice Judith
Ginsburg’s concurrence began with a
statement that could be construed as
focusing on the motivation of the harasser
when she stated, “The critical issue, Title
VII’s text indicates, is whether members
of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not
exposed.”11 The logical extension of this
statement is that in the absence of evi-
dence that the harasser treated the plaintiff
differently than the members of the other
sex, the harasser’s subjective motivation
for the harassment naturally comes into
play. Justice Ginsburg did not, however,
continue with this point. In fact, the
remainder of Justice Ginsburg’s concur-
rence ignored motivation and focused
exclusively on conduct. Ginsburg stated,
“The adjudicator’s inquiry should center,
dominantly, on whether the discrimina-
tory conduct has unreasonably interfered
with the plaintiff’s work performance. To
show such interference . . . it suffices to
prove that a reasonable person subjected
to the discriminatory conduct would find,
as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so
altered working conditions as to make it
more difficult to do the job.”12
Courts Presumed the Motivation
in Opposite-sex Harassment
Was Sexual Gratification
Notwithstanding the probative value of
the harasser’s motivation, Justices Scalia’s
and Ginsburg’s emphasis on conduct was
understandable in Harris for two reasons.
First, the facts of the case centered on con-
duct. Second, throughout the history of
sexual harassment law, the motivation of
the harasser was typically a matter of pre-
sumption. In the vast majority of cases, the
plaintiff was harassed by a member of the
opposite sex and the conduct was “sexual
in nature.” Indeed, the conduct was so
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often sexual in nature that the term
became part of the definition of sexual
harassment in many jurisdictions.13 Defin-
ing sexual harassment as being sexual in
nature seemingly took motivation off the
table by presuming the harasser’s motiva-
tion: if the plaintiff and harasser were of
the opposite sex and conduct was sexual,
courts presumed that the motivation was
due to the sex of the plaintiff. Defendants
rarely, if ever, contested this presumption.
Thus, in traditional opposite-sex harass-
ment cases, where the conduct was sexual,
motivation was never at issue. Instead, the
only issues for the fact finder to decide
were (1) did the conduct occur and (2) was
it severe or pervasive. Over time, however,
a number of cases that did not fit into this




In Cline v. General Electric Capital
Auto Lease, Inc., plaintiff Cline alleged
that her supervisor sexually harassed her
by, for example, calling her pet names and
keeping track of the amount of time she
spent in the bathroom.14 The court
explained that the plaintiff did not have a
case of sexual harassment, because the
conduct alleged was not sexual in nature.
In some jurisdictions, such a finding
would have ended the case right there. The
Cline Court, however, found a different
cause of action under Title VII, namely,
“gender harassment.” Gender harassment,
the Cline Court held, occurred when the
plaintiff proved that (1) she was harassed,
(2) the conduct was severe or pervasive,
(3) the conduct was not sexual in nature,
and (4) the plaintiff’s gender motivated
the harasser.15 This holding set up a three-
way jurisdictional split among those
courts that required sexual harassment
plaintiffs to allege conduct that was sexual
in nature, those courts that did not so
require, and those that recognized gender
harassment as a legitimate cause of action.
At the same time, sexual harassment
law became further muddled by a different
type of case that began to appear in the
courts: same-sex sexual harassment. Pre-
dictably, the courts split on how to address
this new development.
Same-sex Sexual Harassment
Created a Logical and Legal
Mess
The first generation of same-sex sexual
harassment claims resulted in four sub-
stantively different holdings. First, in Gar-
cia v. Elf Atochem North America, the
Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not
make out a case of same-sex harassment
under Title VII.16 Then, in Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am. and McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, the
Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff could
state a claim for same-sex harassment but
only if the harasser was homosexual.17
Next, the Eighth Circuit, in Quick v.
Donaldson, held that a plaintiff could
make out a same-sex harassment case only
if one gender—and not the other—was
exposed to the conduct in question, thereby
absolving the “equal-opportunity” sexual
harasser from liability. Finally, in Doe v.
Belleville, the Seventh Circuit held that a
plaintiff could state a claim for same-sex
sexual harassment where the harassment
was due to the plaintiff’s failure to live up
to sexual stereotype.18 Because of its
overbroad language and the fact that it did
not discuss sexual stereotyping until near
the end of fifty-page opinion, some courts
interpreted Doe as holding that any severe
or pervasive conduct of a sexual nature
was per se unlawful.19 Despite the implica-
tion, the Doe Court did not hold that sex-
MAY 2004 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 175
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW LEGAL
ual conduct was per se unlawful but that
conduct motivated by sexual stereotyping
was unlawful.
Motivationally speaking. The Sev-
enth and Eighth Circuit holdings were
intriguing because they focused on the
motivation of the harasser, which cannot
be gauged by conduct alone. Under both
holdings, the plaintiffs had to prove not
only that they were harassed but also the
reason for the harassment. Conversely, the
Fourth Circuit’s holding was similar to
traditional sexual harassment law. The
court considered sexual preference as a
threshold question and then held that a
plaintiff who belonged to the gender that
the harasser “preferred” could prove sex-
ual harassment with conduct alone. We
see the Fifth Circuit’s holding as being
simply absurd. Say that a male manager
terminated the employment of a female
subordinate for refusing the manager’s
demands for sexual relations. Hypotheti-
cally, that manager would be guilty of sex-
ual harassment, and the company would
be liable for back pay, reinstatement,
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees, and up to
$300,000 in punitive damages. However,
under the Fifth Circuit’s holding, if that
hypothetical employee is male, he has no
redress and must either acquiesce to the
supervisor’s sexual demands or lose his
job. This holding makes no sense.
The Supreme Court first addressed the
question of same-sex sexual harassment in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
in which the Court found that motivation
was the key issue in sexual harassment
cases.
20 Specifically, the Court held that
plaintiffs could state a claim for sexual
harassment if, and only if, they were
harassed “because of sex.” Oncale arose in
the Fifth Circuit, where courts had previ-
ously held that a plaintiff could never
make out a claim for same-sex sexual
harassment. The Supreme Court expressly
rejected the Fifth Circuit’s holding and
also rejected the Fourth Circuit’s holding
that a same-sex sexual harassment claim
depended on the sexual orientation or
preference of the harasser. The Court did
not specifically address the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s holding in Doe v. City of Belleville,
that a plaintiff could make out a case if he
were harassed because of a failure to live
up to sexual stereotype, but did reject the
Seventh Circuit’s “suggest[ion] that work-
place harassment that is sexual in content
is always actionable, regardless of the
harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or moti-
vations.”21 Finally, although not explicitly
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s holding in
Quick v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court
seemed to endorse the logic of that deci-
sion in finding that a plaintiff could sus-
tain a claim for same-sex sexual harass-
ment with proof that the plaintiff’s gender
motivated the harasser, with the following
language: “the plaintiff . . . must always
prove that the conduct at issue . . . actually
constituted ‘discrimination . . . because
of . . . sex.’”22
To illustrate its holding, the Oncale
Court provided three different examples
of actionable same-sex sexual harassment
where the harasser was motivated by the
plaintiff’s sex. First, the Court held that a
plaintiff could sustain a same-sex sexual
harassment claim if “there were credible
evidence that the harasser was homosex-
ual.”23 Next, the Court stated that “a trier of
fact might reasonably find such discrimi-
nation, for example, if a female victim is
harassed in such sex-specific and deroga-
tory terms by another woman as to make it
clear that the harasser is motivated by gen-
eral hostility to the presence of women in
the workplace.”24 Finally, the Court held
that a plaintiff could make out a case by
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comparing his or her treatment to that of
the opposite sex, stating that “a same-
sex harassment plaintiff may also, of
course, offer direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace.”25
At first glance, these three examples
seem both logical and unproblematic.
Accordingly, proemployee commentators
and gay-rights advocates immediately
hailed the decision as being great
advancement for all employees—both gay
and heterosexual. Indeed, it is difficult to
find fault with the first two examples.
Homosexuals who harass employees of
the same gender are likely to be motivated
by the employees’ gender. Similarly, a
supervisor who uses sex-specific terms in
harassing an employee is also probably
motivated by sex. The third example, how-
ever, created problems for courts and
plaintiffs alike. In a 1998 article, we pre-
dicted these problems by taking this hold-
ing to its logical extension and contending
that if plaintiffs could prove sexual harass-
ment by showing that opposite sex
employees did not suffer the same treat-
ment, then employers could defend
harassment cases by proving that mem-
bers of both sexes were subject to the same
treatment.2 6 Such a showing by an
employer, we contended, would act as
complete defense to either a same-sex or
opposite-sex harassment claim. Based on
our analysis at the time, we concluded
that the Oncale Court had codified a
defense to sexual harassment that had
been bandied about for years, that is, the
equal-opportunity harasser.27
The Equal-Opportunity-
Harasser Defense Is a Natural
Outgrowth of Oncale
In the years following Oncale, our pre-
diction came to pass. A 2001 Cornell
Quarterly article traced the development
of the equal-opportunity-harasser
defense. In that article, we discussed
Holman v. Indiana, a case where a hus-
band and wife alleged that their supervisor
requested oral sex from each of them.28
They refused and sued. The U.S. Court of
Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, citing
Oncale, dismissed the case on the grounds
that the harasser harassed members of
both sexes and therefore was not moti-
vated because of sex.29 Other courts, how-
ever, refused to accept this defense and
either (1) expressly rejected it30 or (2)
found another reason to justify a finding of
harassment despite the fact that both men
and women suffered the treatment at
issue.31
To some, the equal-opportunity-
harasser defense is an anomaly that will
have little real effect because facts giving
rise to its use will rarely occur. We con-
tend, however, that the defense will have
profound consequences on traditional
opposite-sex sexual harassment cases
because alleged harassers can now testify
that any number of non–sex-related sub-
jective motivations compelled their con-
duct. As stated above, in opposite-sex sex-
ual harassment cases, courts presumed
that sexual conduct directed at a specific
plaintiff was because of sex. After Oncale,
the presumption remains, but it now may
be rebutted. Providing alleged harassers
with the subjective factual defense of “I
was not motivated by sex,” an argument
that cannot be easily overcome by plain-
tiffs, changes the face of sexual harass-
ment law. The plaintiff must rebut this tes-
timony and prove that the plaintiff’s sex
motivated the harasser. This will be diffi-
cult in many cases and impossible in a
number of situations because of the sub-
jective nature of this kind of evidence. In
addition, we believe that the logic behind
the equal-opportunity-harassment
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defense will virtually eliminate cases
where the plaintiff is not the intended
victim of the harassment.
The Viability of Sexual
Harassment Cases Not Directed
at a Specific Person Is in
Question
To expand on that last point, sexual
harassment claims where the plaintiff is
not an intended victim of the harassment,
but is merely an observer to “sexual con-
duct,” appear to be dead. Before Oncale,
there were a number of cases where
women successfully brought sexual
harassment cases based on the display of
pornography in the workplace or sexually
charged comments and banter among men
or by men but within the earshot of both
men and women. The viability of these
cases is now in serious question because
the conduct bears no relationship to the
plaintiff’s sex. Thus, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for a women to support a
complaint that she has been harassed
“because of her sex” based on evidence of
(1) pictures of naked women that either
predated the plaintiff’s employment or
were not directed at the plaintiff, (2) sexu-
ally explicit conversations between men
that happened to be in the same vicinity as
the plaintiff, or (3) a tirade by a male
supervisor that is directed at both men and
women and is filled with sexually explicit
terms. These claims no longer make sense
under the because-of-sex requirement of
Oncale.32
The Unsettled Nature
of the Law Is a Problem
for Employers and
Employees Alike
At this point, an employer reading this
article might think that post-Oncale sex-
ual harassment developments seem like
good news. Oncale purported to open the
door to a whole new set of claims when, in
fact, it made it more difficult for certain
sexual harassment claims to succeed by
creating a number of new defenses. While
it is true that employers may have addi-
tional defenses after Oncale, this new
standard may ultimately prove to be a neg-
ative development for employers. First,
the fact that supervisors may lawfully
harass men and women, as long as they do
so evenhandedly, or that employees may
display pornography in the worksite with-
out legal consequence is inconsistent with
the fundamental logic of both sexual
harassment law and good management
practices. These seemingly illogical
results created by the Oncale Court’s
emphasis on motivation as the sine qua
non of sexual harassment liability further
muddies an already confusing legal rubric
for employers. Moreover, the illogical
and arguably unjust results in certain fac-
tual settings under the Oncale standard
will cause some courts to contort the law
to avoid such results, thus further confus-
ing employers who are in good faith
seeking a practical standard for liability
prevention.
Employers are best off when the law is
reasonable and clear. When that is the
case, employers can create polices and
practices that are straightforward, intu-
itive to most rational employees, and
effective at avoiding legal liability in
most situations. When the law is an ever-
changing swirl of prohibitions and excep-
tions, employers often feel compelled to
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Holdings in sexual harassment cases have made
matters murkier, even as employers seek clarity.
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1964: Congress passes and President Johnson signs the Civil
Rights Act of 1964
Action: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national ori-
gin, religion, and sex.
1986: Meritor Saving Bank v. Vinson (Supreme Court)
Action: Supreme Court addressed the question of whether employers violated Title VII when a supervisor
harassed an employee, but the employee did not suffer any tangible economic consequences. The Court held
that “sexual harassment” did, in fact, violate Title VII, regardless of whether there was an economic loss
because the harassment, if bad enough, changed the conditions of employment. The Court also defined sexual
harassment as coming in one of two forms: (1) quid pro quo and (2) hostile environment.
Unresolved Issue: The court did not expressly (1) define hostile environment, (2) state when employers are lia-
ble for the actions of their supervisors, and (3) set forth the relevance of motivation of the alleged harasser or
the reasons supervisors might harass employees.
1991: Cline v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. (2nd district)
Action: Created “gender harassment” as a cause of action under Title VII.
Unresolved Issue: Decision set up a three-way jurisdictional split between those courts that required sexual
harassment plaintiffs to allege conduct that was sexual in nature, those that did not, and those that recognized
gender harassment as a legitimate cause of action.
1993: Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc. (Supreme Court)
Action: Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not prove psychological damage to prove sexual harassment.
Instead, the Court held that a plaintiff need only prove that the conduct, from both an objective (the so-called
reasonable person) and a subjective (the plaintiff himself/herself) perspective was “so severe or pervasive that
it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin.”
Unresolved Issue: What does severe or pervasive really mean? Does the harasser’s motivation matter or does
sexual conduct create a presumption that the motivation was the employee’s gender?
1994–1998: Same-sex sexual harassment creates a split among the circuit courts.
1994: Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America (Fifth Circuit)
Action: Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not make out a case of same-sex harassment under Title VII.
1996: Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., McWilliams v. Fiarfax County Bd. Of Supervisors
Action: Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff could state a claim for same-sex harassment but only if the harasser
was homosexual.
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1996: Quick v. Donaldson
Action: Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff could make out a same-sex harassment case only if one gender—
and not the other—was exposed to the conduct in question, thereby absolving the “equal-opportunity” sex-
ual harasser from liability.
1997–1998: Doe v. City of Belleville
Action: Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could state a claim for same-sex sexual harassment where the
harassment was due to the plaintiff’s failure to live up to sexual stereotype. Opinion suggests that severe or
pervasive conduct of the sexual nature is per se unlawful.
1998: Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services
Action: Supreme Court first addresses the question of same-sex sexual harassment. The Supreme Court
explicitly rejects (1) the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a same-sex sexual harassment claim depended on the
sexual orientation or preference of the harasser; (2) the Fifth Circuit’s holding that plaintiff could never make
out a claim for same-sex sexual harassment; and (3) the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion that workplace harass-
ment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser’s sex, sexual orientation, or
motivations. The Court rules that harassment must be “because of sex.” Seemed to endorse the logic of the
Eighth Circuit that a plaintiff could sustain a claim for same-sex sexual harassment with proof that the plain-
tiff’s gender motivated the harasser. Seemed to eliminate viability of sexual harassment cases not directed at
a specific person.
Issues: Taking this holding to its logical extension, one can infer that if (1) plaintiffs could prove sexual harass-
ment by showing that opposite sex employees did not suffer the same treatment, then (2) employers could
defend harassment cases by proving that members of both sexes were subject to the same treatment (i.e., the
equal-opportunity harasser).
2000–2003: More splits between circuit courts materialize.
2000: Holman v. Indiana
Action: Seventh Circuit upholds the equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
2001: Brown v. Henderson
Action: Second Circuit expressly rejects equal-opportunity-harasser defense.
2003: Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel
Action: Ninth Circuit found another reason to justify a finding of harassment. Holds that plaintiffs can prove
sexual harassment by showing that conduct was sexual and not all employees (men and/or women) were
subjected to such conduct.
Unresolved Issue: Different standards across circuits prevents well-meaning employers from being apply to
implement polices that ensure compliance with the law.
create overreaching policies to cover all
contingencies. Such polices are difficult to
implement and enforce, cost the employer
too much money, and may damage
employee morale. However, based on
decisions like Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., employers may have no choice but to
insist on strict policies.33
Rene Epitomizes the Problems
with the Law
In Rene, the plaintiff, a butler at the
MGM Grand, alleged that he had been
sexually harassed. According to the plain-
tiff, the harassers’ conduct included whis-
tling and blowing kisses at Rene, calling
him “sweetheart” and “muneca” (Spanish
for “doll”), telling crude jokes and giving
sexually oriented “joke” gifts, and forcing
Rene to look at pictures of naked men
having sex.34 Moreover, on “more times
than [Rene said he] could possibly
count,” the harassment involved offen-
sive physical conduct of a sexual nature.35
Rene gave deposition testimony that he
was caressed and hugged and that his
coworkers would “touch [his] body like
they would to a woman.”36 On numerous
occasions, he said, they grabbed him in the
crotch and poked their fingers in his anus
through his clothing. When asked why the
harassers directed such conduct at him,
the plaintiff stated that it was because he
was gay.37
Rene presented a case where the
employee suffered from harassment that
was sexual in nature and both severe and
pervasive. As such, the conduct more than
satisfied the criteria set out in Harris Fork-
lift. Under the Oncale standard, however,
the appellate court should have dismissed
the cases after hearing the plaintiff’s
admission that Rene’s sexual orientation,
not his gender, motivated the harassers.
This is the case because sexual orientation
is not a protected class under federal law
and, thus, harassment because of sexual
orientation is not illegal. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however,
failed to apply the Oncale because-of-sex
standard and did not dismiss the case.
Instead, we believe that the court misap-
plied the law to achieve a positive result
for the plaintiff.
The Rene Court acknowledged that the
lower (trial) court had dismissed the case
because of the plaintiff’s testimony that he
had been harassed because he was gay. In
reversing this holding, the Rene Court,
without citing any precedent, rejected the
holding. In fact, in response to the lower
court’s holding that harassment based on
orientation is not unlawful, the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated, “This is not the law. We have
surveyed the many cases finding a viola-
tion of Title VII based on the offensive
touching of the genitalia, buttocks, or
breasts of women. In none of those cases
has a court denied relief because the vic-
tim was, or might have been, a lesbian.
The sexual orientation of the victim
was simply irrelevant. If sexual orienta-
tion is irrelevant for a female victim, we
see no reason why it is not also irrelevant
for a male victim.”38
Although this comment may make
sense on its face, the court’s holding
plainly ignores the fact that Congress has
expressly rejected an amendment to Title
VII that would protect sexual orienta-
tion.39 The statement also ignores the law
as set forth in Oncale. Undoubtedly, the
cases referenced but not cited by the court
dealt with traditional male-on-female
sexual harassment. Because the conduct
was sexual in nature, the courts presumed
that the harasser’s motivation was
because of sex. Such a scenario is easily
distinguishable from Rene because, after
Oncale, the presumption that sexual con-
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duct is because of sex is either not avail-
able or, at best, is rebuttable. Here, the
plaintiff himself rebutted the presump-
tion. He testified that the conduct was
motivated by his own sexual orientation
not his gender.
To underscore what we see as the Ninth
Circuit’s mistake in Rene, the court actu-
ally cites Oncale as supporting its holding.
The court correctly states that in Oncale,
the Supreme Court found a cause of action
for same-sex sexual harassment when the
harasser engages in severe or pervasive
sexual touching. Furthermore, the court
acknowledges that Oncale requires a
plaintiff to prove disparate treatment.
However, the Ninth Circuit then develops
a completely novel test for disparate treat-
ment when it allows Rene to sustain his
claim upon proof that he was treated dif-
ferently than other men. Thus, under
Rene, a plaintiff establishes sexual harass-
ment by proving that (1) the conduct was
sexual, (2) the conduct was severe or per-
vasive, and (3) other employees, whether
men or women, were not harassed.40
Stated another way, Rene allows a plaintiff
to recover for harassment that is sexual
in content, as long as all other employ-
ees were not subjected to such conduct.
The harasser’s sex, sexual orientation,
and motivation are irrelevant. This hold-
ing is almost identical to the Johnson v.
Hondo Court’s interpretation of the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision Doe v. City of
Belleville. Once again, in Oncale, the
Supreme Court expressly rejected this
interpretation.41
The Ninth Circuit also justifies its find-
ing of disparate treatment on the ground
that Rene was singled out for harassment.
However, the plaintiff in Oncale suffered
the same fate, and the Supreme Court
remanded that case to determine whether
“the conduct at issue was not merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations,
but actually constituted ‘discrimina-
tion . . . because of . . . sex.’”42 Accord-
ingly, Oncale makes clear that the mere
singling out of a plaintiff for harassment
cannot answer the question of whether
that plaintiff has suffered disparate
treatment.
Sexual Stereotyping
Is Another Method for
Creating a Cause of
Action
As if the Ninth Circuit’s majority opin-
ion was not enough to muddy the sexual
harassment waters, the concurring opin-
ion proposes yet another basis for Rene to
prove disparate impact on these facts. The
concurrence suggests that Rene could
prove disparate treatment by showing that
the plaintiff’s failure to live up to a sexual
stereotype motivated the discriminator.
This theory formed the basis of the
Supreme Court’s 1988 Price-Waterhouse
v. Hopkins decision.43 In Hopkins, the
plaintiff alleged that the firm discrimi-
nated against her because she was “con-
sidered too aggressive and not feminine
enough for a woman.” The Court held that
employers violate Title VII when they
subject employees to discrimination or
harassment because the employee failed
to live up to a sexual stereotype.
The Ninth Circuit’s concurrence in
Rene relies on Hopkins and a subsequent
line of cases and contends that employers
violate the law when supervisors harass
gay men who do not live up to a male sex-
ual stereotype. There are, however, some
obvious fundamental problems with this
argument. First, Rene never pleaded that
he was harassed because of his failure to
live up to a sexual stereotype. Moreover,
the argument raises a number of questions.
First, are all homosexuals protected by the
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law because, by definition, they fail to live
up to sexual stereotypes, or is this protec-
tion reserved only for effeminate men and
masculine women? Second, is it appropri-
ate for the courts to make homosexuality a
protected class when Congress has
expressly rejected this addition to the law?
Third, should the law create a situation
where an individual, like Joseph Oncale, a
man who was sodomized and abused,
would win his case if he were effeminate
or gay but lose if he were neither effemi-
nate nor homosexual? In other words,
should it be lawful to sodomize Oncale if
he is heterosexual and masculine in
behavior and appearance?
We contend that regardless of the
answer to question one, the answer to
questions two and three is a resounding
no. Trying to combat blatant sexual con-
duct by relying on sexual stereotyping cre-
ates as many problems as the shortsighted
holding of Oncale. As we stated in 1998,
there is a relatively easy way to fix the
problems with sexual harassment law.44
We suggest that Congress create a statute
stating the following: conduct of the sex-
ual nature should be per se unlawful if it is
severe or pervasive. Under this rule, all
employees—gay or heterosexual—would
be free from overt sexual conduct that has
no legitimate purpose in the workplace.
Unfortunately, our proposed standard is
not the law. Thus, employers are left to fol-
low a moving target as courts like the
Ninth Circuit make new law. This fact
raises the following question: what should
employers do?
What Employers Should Do
Our answer to the what-to-do question
is, to begin with, employers must under-
stand the law. Next, they must teach the
law to their managers. Last, employers
should teach the law to their employees.
Once everyone in the organization under-
stands the inconsistencies and general
absurdities of the law, it is possible to
establish polices and practices that can rid
the workplace of objectionable conduct
and minimize legal liability. As stated
above, too often sexual harassment train-
ing consists of dos and don’ts without
explanations. Managers and employees
often resent sexual harassment polices
because they do not understand the theory
behind those policies. We contend that a
well-conceived communication and train-
ing process can alleviate the angst created
by sexual harassment policies. With such
an approach, the company can explain (1)
how misunderstandings can result in sex-
ual harassment claims and (2) that such
claims can destroy the lives of employees
and jeopardize the company. This is why
we strongly recommend that all training to
prevent sexual harassment include a dis-
cussion of the law. That way, managers
and employees can understand the
minefield that employers are attempting to
navigate.
Of course, education is not enough;
employers need concrete polices. Some
employers ban all sexual conduct with so-
called zero-tolerance policies. These poli-
cies are controversial because they are
hard to enforce. People spend a lot of time
at work and, depending on the environ-
ment of the workplace, may at times
engage in sexual banter. The hospitality
industry is notorious for being a place
where such banter is prevalent. Managers
working with such polices are put in a dif-
ficult situation. Should they “violate” the
policy by letting some banter occur, or
should they strictly enforce the policy
and create morale problems? Neither
approach is satisfactory. On the other
hand, employers who do not have such
polices are susceptible to claims that they
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did not exercise reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassment because they
effectively allowed a line supervisor to
determine the law.
While there is no right answer, we agree
with those who advise employers to enact
zero-tolerance policies. This must be the
company’s policy because it is the best
defense against a claim of harassment. We
hope, however, that the communication
program mentioned above will make such
a policy more palatable by explaining to
the employees the reasons behind the
concept.
In dealing with reported complaints,
we suggest, however, that our standard be
the guiding principle for employers.
Employers who eliminate sexual conduct
that is severe or pervasive, regardless of
the harasser’s motives, will not have to
rely on the equal-opportunity-harasser
defense or be concerned that a court may
follow Rene. Instead, they will have com-
plied with the law and, in some cases,
exceeded what the law requires. More-
over, they will have provided a workplace
that is free from the type of conduct that
serves no legitimate purpose.
Applying this standard is also appropri-
ate when meting out discipline. If the con-
duct alleged is sexual and severe or perva-
sive, the discipline should be extreme. If it
is not sexual or not severe or pervasive,
the discipline should be moderate. This is
the case even if the company has a zero-
tolerance policy. Companies do not want
to lose good employees or create morale
problems by discharging an employee
who violates a zero-tolerance policy but
does not come close to violating the law.
On the other hand, employers do not want
merely to slap the wrist of an employee or
manager whose conduct could lead to
finding of harassment against the com-
pany. Basing discipline on our proposed
standard will ensure that employers avoid
such problems. Employers should not,
however, make close calls. If you think a
situation may be severe or pervasive, treat
it as though it is.
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